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In the past two decades the major policy response to high unemployment rates in
Europe has been the reduction of Employment Protection Legislation (henceforth
EPL) through the liberalisation of temporary contracts.1 A large literature has
established the importance of temporary contracts in a⁄ecting job ￿ ows by in-
creasing both the hiring and the ￿ring of workers. Although much less researched
in theory and in practice, it is plausible that temporary contracts also have a
bearing on ￿rms￿capital investment decisions, on the capital￿ labour ratio and,
eventually, on productivity. While the e⁄ects of EPL on productivity have been
assessed in the past (see Autor et al., 2007, Bassanini et al., 2009, and Cingano et
al., 2010), the productivity impact of temporary contracts liberalisation has never
been evaluated using ￿rm-level data and we are the ￿rst to provide this type of
evidence.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the e⁄ects of the institutional changes
of two di⁄erent types of temporary contracts which constitute the core of recent
labour market policy in Italy. We analyse the e⁄ects of these changes on job ￿ ows,
employment, capital￿ labour substitution and productivity. The ￿rst institutional
change has to do with the implementation of a national law (legislated in 2001)
which eased the use of ￿xed-term contracts by cancelling the need of giving a
justi￿cation for the use of these contracts. While the law set out nationally a
general framework for the use of ￿xed-term contracts, the actual implementation
of its provisions required their approval through the rounds of collective bargain-
ing that took place sector-wise in the subsequent years (starting in 2005, much
later than the national law). The actual way in which each sector of the economy
implemented the law was therefore di⁄erent, and the timing of the implementa-
1Among the countries in the European Union, France, Italy, Germany, Spain and Portugal
liberalised temporary contracts over the 1980s and 1990s.
2tion varied according to the staggered structure of collective bargaining rounds.
This feature generates variation across sector and over time in ￿rms￿exposure to
the new provisions, which we exploit in estimation. The second reform concerns
apprenticeship contracts for young workers. It was meant to stimulate the use
of these contractual arrangements mainly by weakening the need of training cer-
ti￿cations and extending the scope of their applicability to individuals up to 30
years of age. The relevant law was legislated in 2003 but required regional govern-
ments to issue implementation guidelines, which happened di⁄erentially by region
in the subsequent years (also starting in 2005). This feature of the legislative
process generates variation across regions and time in ￿rms￿ability to use the new
contracts.
A further contribution of this paper is that we estimate the elasticity of sub-
stitution between di⁄erent types of temporary contracts. Economic models neces-
sarily simplify the actual use of temporary and permanent contracts and consider
one single type of temporary contract. However in practice in all countries there
exist di⁄erent types of temporary contracts, typically the result of repeated at-
tempts at making the labour market more ￿ exible leaving the open-end contracts
untouched. Italian employers can use four types of temporary contracts with
di⁄erent characteristics: apprenticeships (Apprendistato), ￿xed-term (Tempo De-
terminato), collaboration workers (Collaborazioni Coordinate e Continuative, the
so called co.co.co, a sort of consultant hired on a temporary basis) and temporary
agency jobs (Interinali). These contracts di⁄er along various dimensions such as
illness provisions, minimum wages, age restrictions, temporal limits and number
of allowed repetitions of the same contract. The perception among labour lawyers
and entrepreneurs is that they are highly substitutable but so far there is no hard
evidence of this.
We have ￿rm-level data on the use of the four di⁄erent types of temporary
3labour contracts and on permanent ones and we show that the e⁄ect of the reform
of one type of labour contract may work also through the substitution with other
types. This is the ￿rst paper, as far as we know, which studies the substitutability
across di⁄erent types of temporary contracts and highlights the potential conse-
quences of a high elasticity of substitution.
We ￿nd that the reform of apprenticeship contracts has been successful be-
cause it increased the turnover of workers easing the adjustment process of ￿rms,
encouraged the substitution of external sta⁄ with apprentices and eventually in-
creased productivity. The reform of ￿xed-term contracts, instead, does not seem
to have had the intended results. The fact that the implementation of the na-
tional law required approval through collective bargaining rounds and that the
new contract itself was subject to high degree of uncertainty may have altered
the original spirit of the law and made the use of ￿xed-term contracts less costly
but more "risky". This reform reduced overall job turnover, induced substitution
with permanent workers and a lower use of capital per worker, which eventually
reduced all measures of ￿rm-level productivity (value added per worker, revenues
per worker, TFP).
The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2 we review the literature, in Section 3
we describe the institutional changes, in Section 4 we describe the data, in Sections
5 and 6 we present, respectively, the estimation framework and the results and we
conclude in Section 7.
2 Related literature
Temporary contracts are typically used for di⁄erent reasons: for screening pur-
poses, to temporarily ￿ll in for sta⁄ who are absent or leave, or to accommodate
￿ uctuations in demand. In many cases employers also save in labor costs and
4social security bene￿ts using temporary contracts (Houseman, 2001). Temporary
jobs inhibit labor market advancement if these jobs displace more productive em-
ployment activities. However they may also increase employment and earnings
if they substitute for spells of unemployment. The e⁄ect of temporary contracts
on productivity depends on whether temporary positions on average complement
or displace permanent jobs. In this respect the literature on temporary jobs -
which mostly looks at the employment e⁄ects rather than wage e⁄ects - is very
heterogenous and does not draw a general conclusion.
Using a natural experiment Autor and Houseman (2010) show that temporary
help positions reduce earnings and employment probabilities in the US. Kvasnicka
(2008) ￿nds that holding a temporary contract after a spell of unemployment has
at best a null e⁄ect on the probability of ￿nding a permanent job. With an eye to
European labour markets, Blanchard and Landier (2002) and Cahuc and Postel-
Vinay (2002) model temporary contracts as churning policies that a⁄ect negatively
wage setting and may generate higher unemployment and lower productivity. Con-
trary to this pessimistic vision, if ￿xed-term contracts are used as a bu⁄er-stock
to boost the number of hirings in a boom, employment and productivity may go
up at least temporarily (Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1992, and Boeri and Garibaldi,
2007). Some papers show that being assigned to a temporary contract has a causal
e⁄ect on the probability of ￿nding a permanent match (for example Ichino et al.,
2008, and Booth et al., 2002). According to this view temporary contracts are
good screening devices and stepping stones into permanent jobs and therefore in-
crease productivity. While existing studies on temporary employment have been
considering all these aspects, an evaluation of the relationship between temporary
contracts and ￿rms productivity is still missing in the literature so far.
The speci￿c literature on temporary contracts is also strictly related to the
more general one on EPL. In continental Europe many countries relaxed the rules
5about the use of temporary contracts with the aim of reducing adjustment costs for
￿rms facing high EPL for standard open-ended contracts. Therefore the reforms
designed to make the use of temporary contracts easier constitute a reduction in
EPL but also create dual or two-tier labour markets (see Dolado et al., 2002, for
Spain, and Holmlund and Storrie, 2002, for Sweden).2 EPL raises the cost of
employing workers and reduces labour demand unless wages fall to cover exactly
the cost of the bene￿t (Lazear, 1990).3 Because part of EPL constitutes a tax that
goes to third parties - lawyers and administrative costs - EPL is by all means an
adjustment cost and there is overwhelming evidence that it reduces the volatility
of employment (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990). In the following we do not review
the huge literature on EPL and job ￿ ows and we concentrate on the literature
that looks at the relationship between EPL and investment and between EPL
and productivity. The e⁄ects on productivity and investment are theoretically
ambiguous (Ljungqvist, 2002) but we use the insights of this literature to interpret
our results.
On the one hand there are multiple mechanisms that may induce a negative
e⁄ect of an increase in EPL on productivity. High EPL hampers the reallocation of
workers and jobs across industries and ￿rms by inducing substitution of speci￿c for
general skills (Samaniego, 2006, and Wasmer, 2006); reduces workers e⁄ort (Ichino
and Riphahn, 2005, Riphahn and Engellandt, 2005, Dolado and Stucchi, 2008);
reduces the undertaking of highly productive but risky activities (Bartelsman and
Hinloopen, 2005). On the other hand other mechanisms indicate a positive rela-
2The OECD produces di⁄erent indices of employment protection, including one related to
the regulation of temporary contracts only. When the index is built considering only the legal
treatment of ￿xed-term contracts, the negative correlation between EPL and job ￿ ows is signi￿-
cantly stronger (Martin and Scarpetta, 2011). Temporary contracts and EPL are related also in
the US: Autor (2003) showed that higher EPL induced a higher use of temporary agency jobs in
the US.
3Analyzing the 1990 Italian reform of EPL, Leonardi and Pica (2010) show that the fall in
wages in not a perfect o⁄set of the increased severance costs and conclude therefore that EPL
imposes e¢ ciency costs in the competitive model.
6tionship between EPL and productivity. More stringent EPL provides insurance
and may promote speci￿c investments (Belot et al., 2007); selects the most pro-
ductive ￿rms which withstand the costs of EPL (Poschke, 2009 and 2010); makes
￿rms become more selective with workers and less productive matches are not
realised (Lagos, 2006).
There are theoretical reasons to expect also an ambiguous e⁄ect of temporary
contracts and EPL on the capital￿ labour ratio. In labour markets with no frictions
an increase in the cost of labour will in general imply substitution of labour with
more capital and therefore a positive relationship between EPL and capital￿ labour
ratios. A related case arises in the long run: higher EPL means that labour is
more costly and when adopting new technologies ￿rms will choose more capital
intensive technologies (see among others Caballero and Hammour, 1998, Alesina
and Zeira, 2006 and Koeniger and Leonardi, 2007). Models with wage bargaining
between workers and ￿rms instead point to a negative relationship between EPL
and capital￿ labour ratios. When there is wage bargaining, workers will use the
protection of EPL - which strengthens the outside option of workers - to claim
higher wages (Bentolila and Dolado 1994, and Garibaldi and Violante 2005). As a
result, ￿rms may reduce their investment ex-ante to avoid workers capturing part
of the investment returns (the so called ￿ hold up￿problem).
The empirical part of most of the existing papers on EPL and productivity is
based on cross-country and/or cross-industry regressions which usually ￿nd nega-
tive relationship between EPL and productivity (Micco and PagØs, 2008, Cingano
et al., 2010). The approach based on country or industry data potentially suf-
fers from well-known severe problems: reverse causality and omitted variables and
most studies do not distinguish between EPL provisions for ￿xed-term and perma-
nent contracts. In using ￿rm-level data, our work is close to Autor et al. (2007)
who study the impact of adoption of wrongful-discharge protection norms in the
7US using cross-state di⁄erences in the timing of adoption. Di⁄erently from them
we use a change in EPL that concerns the relaxation of rules about the use of
temporary contracts which is typical of many European countries.
3 Institutional background
Italian employers may chose to utilize labour inputs under a variety of employment
contracts. The most typical form of contract is the permanent one, which has no
termination date and has the highest wedge between workers take home gross pay
and labour costs, caused by taxes and social security contributions. Depending
upon ￿rms characteristics (mainly their size) these contracts are characterised by
relatively stringent EPL and, consequently, high ￿ring costs. A second type of
contract is represented by ￿xed-term contracts. The only di⁄erence between these
and permanent ones is the presence of a ￿xed-term: they typically last for two
years and can be renewed only once within a given ￿rm-worker match. All other
working conditions such as wages, working times, pension rights and probation
periods, are identical to the ones of permanent contracts. Apprenticeships repre-
sent another form of temporary employment contracts. Di⁄erently from ￿xed-term
ones, ￿rms can use these contracts only for younger workers (details on age limits
are given later in this Section), they must provide certi￿ed training to workers, and
pay lower social security contributions. Workers under these three contracts are
employees of the ￿rm. There exist other contractual arrangements through which
￿rms can use the labour services of external sta⁄ without actually hiring workers.
As in many other countries there are temporary help agencies which supply labour
services upon the payment of agency fees. Finally, and this is mostly an Italian
peculiarity, ￿rms can use collaboration contracts. This contractual arrangements
are in place since the early 1970s and were regulated in 1997. They provide a
8contractual framework for individuals who are not employed by the ￿rm but indi-
vidually provide their working services to the ￿rm, either immaterial (consultants)
or material. The labour costs associated with these contracts are low thanks to
a reduced regime of compulsory pension contributions, which induced many ￿rms
to adopt them even in cases in which the worker was in all e⁄ects an employee.
Similarly to other European countries, labour market ￿ exibility has increased in
Italy over the last decades as a result of a series of reforms which introduced various
types of temporary contracts without changing the legislation on permanent, open-
ended, contracts. The most important legislation was:
1. Law no. 196/1997 (the so called ￿ Treu-Package￿ , named after the then min-
ister of labour) which legalised temporary work agencies, regulated collaboration
contracts and liberalised both apprenticeship and ￿xed-term contracts;
2. Decree Law no. 368/2001 which eased restrictions on ￿xed-term contracts
further;
3. Law no. 30/2003 (the so called ￿ Biagi Law￿ , named after the legal expert
killed by terrorists) which introduced a number of new contracts in the national
legislation and reformed the apprenticeship contract.
Our analysis considers data for the period 2004￿ 2007 and focuses on the sec-
ond and third of these reforms. These two measures were implemented at di⁄erent
times in di⁄erent regions and in di⁄erent sectors of the economy, generating vari-
ation in the institutional setting that allows us to use a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences
approach. Both measures￿ although legislated at the national level in 2001 and
2003￿ were implemented starting only in 2005 and therefore can be evaluated us-
ing the available data from 2004 to 2007. We discuss each of the two measures in
turn.
93.1 The ￿ new￿￿xed-term contract
Legislative Decree no. 368/2001 introduced important changes to ￿xed-term em-
ployment contracts. They included two changes of particular importance for the
purposes of this study. The ￿rst and de￿nitely most important modi￿cation con-
cerned what are termed the ￿ reasons￿ , i.e. the circumstances in which this type
of contract may be used. Prior to 2001 the law regulating ￿xed-term contracts
provided a very speci￿c list of circumstances under which ￿rms could use those
contracts, for example peaks in production or replacement of workers on sick leave.
The new decree liberalised the contract by abolishing the detailed list of speci￿c
reasons and introducing the following single general reason: ￿ reasons of a tech-
nical, organisational, production or replacement nature￿ . While this part of the
decree was intended to allow employers greater ￿ exibility in the use of ￿xed-term
contracts, in practice it made the requirements for the use of these contracts too
generic, which inevitably produced uncertainty over the contents of the legislation
and how to apply it (Aimo, 2006). Uncertainty over the contents has generated
di⁄erent interpretations of the decree, in particular on whether or not employers
could recruit workers on ￿xed-term contracts without necessarily demonstrating
the temporary nature of the work performed by those employed on those contracts.
As noted by experts in labour law, this uncertainty may have reversed the origi-
nally intended e⁄ect of the reform, making the use of this type of contracts more
costly, rather than less costly, to ￿rms.
The second change introduced by the decree, which is of particular interest
here, is that it has restrained the scope for unions to a⁄ect the implementation
of national law provisions through collective bargaining that takes place at the
industry level. Under the previous legislation, collective bargaining agreements
could list additional ￿ reasons￿for the use of ￿xed-term contracts over and above
those contained in the national legislation. Given that unions enjoy broad powers
10within collective bargaining agreements, they could￿ and actually did￿ make the
application of ￿xed-term contracts within a given industry more restrictive than
what was established at the national level. The decree abolished the possibility
of including additional ￿ reasons￿through collective bargaining, thereby reducing
union power and increasing the freedom of employers to use ￿xed-term contracts.
We evaluate the e⁄ects of this reform using a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences research
design. The case of the new ￿xed-term contracts lends itself to this type of analysis
since in order to become applicable in a given industry, the new decree needed to
be implemented through the national contracts for that industry. Therefore, only
industries with national contracts negotiated after the decree was legislated, could
apply the new ￿xed-term contracts. In Italy, collective bargaining is staggered by
industry, so that not all industries bargain at the same time. In particular, after
2001 the renegotiation of collective bargaining agreements that implemented the
new contracts at the sectoral level only occurred in some industries (Textiles, Wood
production, Chemicals, Construction, Transportation, Retail trade, Food produc-
tion and Telecommunication), with contracts signed mostly in 2005 and 2006. Our
analysis exploits such variation across industries over time. Other important sec-
tors of the economy such as Metal Manufacturing and Banking reached collective
agreements during the period, but those agreements did not contain provisions
about the use of the new ￿xed-term contract.
3.2 The ￿ new￿apprenticeship contract
Legislation to regulate apprenticeship contracts has existed for a long time and has
also been reformed several times. The lower labour costs associated with these con-
tracts make them particularly convenient to employers. These lower labour costs
are intended to compensate ￿rms for the training costs that they incur. Firms are
required to share training costs by giving apprentices time o⁄ work (for a mini-
11mum number of paid hours) to attend external training courses that are provided
by local authorities or accredited training institutes (and sponsored by the regions)
outside the premises of the ￿rm. At the end of the training period, apprentices
should receive a certi￿cate for the quali￿cation they have attained. There are,
nevertheless, limitations on this formal training activity: lack of public funding
for training, a lack of infrastructures for training courses and little control over
compliance with compulsory training obligations by ￿rms using these contracts.
As a consequence most of the training is in the form of the on-the-job type.
The ￿ Biagi Law￿liberalised this contract further. A new form of apprenticeship
was introduced (apprendistato professionalizzante, literally ￿ apprenticeship leading
to a job￿ ) with the same reduced labour costs as before. The new legislation
abolished the certi￿cation of quali￿cations and extended the scope of the contract
to include persons up to the age of 30 (the previous age limit was 25). The
option of performing training at the workplace as a substitute, at least in part,
for external training courses was also introduced. This last amendment made it
even more di¢ cult to monitor compliance with this obligation by ￿rms. Before the
new law could be implemented, regional governments ￿who have exclusive power
to legislate over vocational training, including the training content of the new
apprenticeships ￿had to issue regional regulations. The regions were, nevertheless,
very slow in issuing these regulations, partly because they lacked the funds needed
to organise the external training for apprentices (despite the reduction in the
quantity of this type of training by the national legislation). Although slow to
act, some regions passed legislation earlier than others. Some regions also enacted
experimental projects for the new contract in speci￿c economic sectors (mainly
Retail trade, Banking and Hotel and restaurants). These experimental projects
were implemented in 2005.
No regions passed any guidelines in 2003 and 2004. In addition to those re-
12gions which introduced sector-speci￿c experimental schemes, in 2005 two regions,
Emilia Romagna and Tuscany, enacted regional regulations to enable the use of
the new contract by all ￿rms. Another four regions followed suit in 2006: Friuli,
Marche, Sardinia and the autonomous province of Bolzano. Finally, regulations
were issued in Lazio in 2007. We exploit this variation over regions and time
in a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences framework. Additional institutional variation in the
implementation of the new contacts was generated by guidelines issued by the
Ministry of Labour in July 2005 (Circolare no. 30), specifying that in the ab-
sence of regional regulations, sector-speci￿c national collective agreements could
specify the training content of the new contracts. Thence, ￿rms in those sectors
that signed bargaining agreements after the guidelines were issued could use the
new apprenticeship contract. Collective agreements were reached in: Textiles,
Wood production, Chemicals, Construction, Transportation, Retail trade, Food
production and Telecommunication, Energy, Banking, and Metal manufacturing.
To sum up, institutional variation in ￿rms￿exposure to the new apprenticeship
contract comes from three sources: regional, sectoral, and regional-sectoral (the
later deriving from the experimental projects of 2005).
4 Data and descriptive statistics
The data set used in this paper is a balanced panel of about 13,000 ￿rms in the
private sector observed over the years 2004￿ 2007, representative of the universe
of corporate ￿rms in the private sector. Firm-level information on the types of
employment contracts used within the ￿rm is derived from the Excelsior data-
base, a survey conducted by Unioncamere (the Association of Italian Chambers of
Commerce) with the aim of providing information on ￿rms￿occupational needs,
in particular the skill requirement of prospective hires. It contains detailed infor-
13mation on the number of workers in the ￿rm, distinguishing across all the various
contractual arrangements that ￿rms may adopt for utilising labour services: per-
manent employment contracts, ￿xed-term employment contracts, apprenticeships,
agency workers and collaborators. The data also provide details on the industry
(3-digit) and geographical location of the ￿rm, which is essential in constructing
the treatment indicators discussed in the institutional section. The other rele-
vant piece of information used in the paper is the balance sheet information which
is derived from the ASIA database, the archive of ￿rm data maintained by the
National Statistical Institute. In particular, ASIA provides information on ￿rms￿
value added, revenues and net physical capital stock.
Based on this information we can construct two treatment dummies capturing
the exposure of ￿rms to the two reforms discussed in the previous Section. We iden-
tify exposure to the reform of ￿xed-term contracts using ￿rms￿sectoral a¢ liation.
Treated sectors are the ones whose national collective agreements were signed af-
ter the nation-wide legislation was passed in 2001, and whose national agreements
explicitly implemented the new legislation. These sectors were Textiles, Wood
production, Chemicals, Construction, Transportation, Retail trade and Food pro-
duction, whose collective agreements were signed in 2005, and Telecommunication,
with agreements reached in 2006. Exposure to the reform of apprenticeships oc-
curred mostly through ￿rms geographical location due to the staggered adoption
of regional regulations implementing the national legislation. The ￿rst regula-
tions were introduced in Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany in 2005, followed by Friuli,
Marche, Sardinia and the autonomous province of Bolzano in 2006 and by Lazio in
2007. Other regions (Piedmont, Lombardy, Umbria, Abruzzo, Campania, Veneto,
Liguria, Marche, Lazio) introduced experimental regulations only in some sectors
(such as Retail trade, Banking and Hotel and restaurants), therefore we include
￿rms operating in those sectors and in those regions in the treatment group. Fi-
14nally, as explained in Section 3, guidelines issued by the Ministry of Labour in July
2005 allowed the possibility to use the new contracts to ￿rms in sectors that would
have reached national agreements afterwards, and we also include these ￿rms in
the treatment group.
In Table 1 we provide a description of the data. We begin by grouping ￿rms
on the basis of their exposures to the reforms, distinguishing never treated ￿rms
from ￿rms treated by the apprenticeships reform and those exposed to the reform
of ￿xed-term contract. Since a ￿rm may be exposed to both reforms, the sum
of the numbers in the three groups exceed the number in the full sample. There
are no ￿rms in the treatment group in 2004. The number of ￿rms treated by
the reform of apprenticeships is relatively small in 2005 (when only two regions
adopted the regulations, while some others introduced experimental regulations in
some sectors) but grows considerably in 2006 as a consequence of the adoption of
regulations by several more regions and of the ministerial guidelines allowing using
the new contracts in additional sectors. The number of treated ￿rms still grows
in 2007 as a consequence of Lazio joining the group of regions issuing regulations.
Exposure to the reform of the ￿xed-term contract follows a di⁄erent pattern: most
￿rms enter the treatment groups in 2005, and the remaining few cases which join
in 2006 are ￿rms in Telecommunication. We compute ￿rm size including also
external sta⁄ (agency workers and collaborators) and obtain an average of about
200 workers (about 190 if excluding external sta⁄), slightly higher among the never
treated and lower among ￿rms in the treatment group of the apprenticeship reform.
The workforce composition is rather stable across groups, but treated ￿rms tend
to have a higher share of ￿xed-term and apprenticeships contracts, whereas never
treated ones use relatively more collaboration contracts. Looking at job turnover
computed as the mean absolute employment change, we can observe that there
are essentially no di⁄erences across treatment groups: average turnover is about
1511 percentage points in each groups, virtually identical to the values reported by
Autor et al. (2007) on plant level data. The percentage of positive changes is 44,
about 5 points lower than the ￿gures of Autor et al. (2007), and there is little
variation across the groups. The geographical distribution of the ￿rms re￿ ects the
well known regional heterogeneity of economic activity in Italy, with most ￿rms
located in the North-west and the North-east. The largest share of ￿rms in the
sample operates in manufacturing. The sectoral distribution by treatment status is
sparse in the case of ￿xed-term contract reform because only ￿rms in some sectors
were treated.
5 Estimation framework
We are interested in assessing the impact of the two reforms on measures of job
turnover, production inputs and productivity. As documented in the previous Sec-
tions, we can exploit in a di⁄erence-in di⁄erences set-up the di⁄erential variation in
exposure to the reforms across regions and sectors over time. Let dF
it be a dummy
capturing the exposure of ￿rm i in time t to the reform of ￿xed-term contracts,
and dA
it a dummy capturing the exposure of ￿rm i in time t to the reform of appren-
ticeships, with t = 2004;:::;2007. In order to ensure that our comparisons across
treatment groups over time do not re￿ ect group-speci￿c characteristics, we con-
trol for time, region and sector ￿xed e⁄ects, plus region-speci￿c and sector-speci￿c
time trends. The latter require that identi￿cation comes from the discontinuity
surrounding the passage of the reforms. These speci￿cations can provide reassur-
ance that estimated reforms e⁄ects are not re￿ ecting smoothly-trending omitted
variables that are potentially correlated with the adoption of the reforms. Our
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where Y is an outcome measure, the ￿ coe¢ cients measure the e⁄ects of the two
reforms on the outcome, ￿t is a time ￿xed e⁄ect, Zr
i and Zs
i are dummy variables
for regions and sectors, so that the ￿ coe¢ cients capture regional (r) and sectoral
(s) ￿xed e⁄ects, while the ￿ coe¢ cients capture region- and sector-speci￿c time
trends, Xit is a vector of controls and "it is an error term. Whenever the outcomes
of interest are in levels we also include ￿rms ￿xed e⁄ects, whereas in the case
for variables derived from di⁄erencing levels, like job turnover, we control for the
presence of repeated observation by ￿rms using a robust variance estimator.
We start by looking at job ￿ ows as the outcome of interest. Speci￿cally, we
consider the year-to-year job turnover de￿ned as in Davis et al. (1996) and Autor
et al (2007) : JTit =
jEit￿Eit￿1j
1
2(Eit+Eit￿1) where Eit is ￿rm i employment in year t.
This measure accounts for the absolute year-to-year employment change by
recording annual net employment ￿ ows. Since we have detailed information on
the type of employment contracts, we are able to estimate the reforms￿impact on
employment ￿ ows considering either total employment and employment in each
contract type. This exercise enables an indirect assessment of the degree of sub-
stitutability between di⁄erent types of employment contracts. In other words, the
e⁄ectiveness of reforms in one type of employment contract greatly depends on the
extent to which ￿rms are able to substitute between contract types. Estimating
the impact of reforming one type of contract on job ￿ ows of another contract type
is a way to assess the existence of substitution e⁄ects across contracts.
Next, our investigation will proceed by applying the estimating framework of
equation (1) to other margins of ￿rms decision, namely employment levels (overall
17and by contract type), capital (total and per worker), investments (total and per
worker) and the skill ratio de￿ned as the ratio between non-manual and manual
workers in the ￿rm. Applying equation (1) to this set of outcomes will o⁄er
a rather complete picture of the e⁄ects of the two reforms on ￿rms production
choices. Finally, we will focus our attention on the results of ￿rms activity, namely
on various measures of productivity. Speci￿cally we will consider value added per
worker, revenues per worker and total factor productivity.
5.1 Assessing the validity of identi￿cation
The validity of the identi￿cation of (1) rests on the exogeneity of the reforms. In the
ideal case, the reform adoption decisions (by the regions and the sectoral bargaining
rounds) would be independent random events that varied in timing and had no
spillover e⁄ects to non-adopting regions or sectors. While ￿rm migration across
sectors and regions to take advantage of the rules is highly unlikely, one possible
concern is that the regions which had higher or lower than average employment
growth in temporary contracts were also the same to adopt the reforms of the
apprenticeship contract or of the ￿xed-term contract.
To dispel this doubt we use data from the Italian Labour Force Survey (LFS)
from 1996￿ 2007. We cannot use our ￿rm-level data because we need to observe
several years of data prior to the reforms to control for pre-dating trends in employ-
ment in temporary contracts, whereas in the Excelsior database 2004 is the only
pre-reform year. Therefore we use LFS data which, although based on individuals
and not on ￿rms, are a representative sample of the Italian labour market. Figure
1 top panel compares the log employment in (all types of) temporary contracts in
the regions adopting the apprenticeship contract reform (treated sample) and in
the non-adopting regions (control sample). The bottom panel does the same for
adopting and non-adopting sectors of the ￿xed-term contract reform. Both panels
18show a similar movement in the two series before the adoption of the two reforms
in 2005 thus supporting the validity of our identi￿cation strategy which is based
on the assumption that the outcomes of interest would have otherwise evolved
similarly in adopting and non-adopting regions and sectors.4
To further prove that preceding trends in temporary employment do not predict
the adoption of the reforms, we regress the two treatment dummies de￿ned at the
sectoral (for the ￿xed-term reform) or regional (for the apprenticeship reform) level
on leads and lags of log employment in temporary contracts computed from the
LFS. The coe¢ cients on the lags are relative to the period four years prior to the
reform, and their pattern indicates whether the coe¢ cients associated with the
reform in equation (1) are consistent with a causal interpretation. In particular,
we would be concerned if there are large and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cients on
the lag indicators, regardless of whether they are positive or negative. The ￿rst two
columns of Table 2 show the e⁄ect of log temporary employment on the adoption
of the apprenticeship contract reform. The results show that past temporary
employment has no signi￿cant e⁄ect on the adoption of the reform. In the same
way the third and fourth columns show that past temporary employment has no
e⁄ect on the adoption of the ￿xed-term contract reform. Overall, the evidence
from both Figure 1 and Table 2 is consistent with a causal interpretation of the
e⁄ects that we are going to discuss in the next Section.
4Clearly the exercise for the apprenticeship reform is incomplete because part of ￿rms expo-
sure occurred at the sectoral, not regional, level while our exercise only considers the regional
dimension. However, as explained in Section 3, the sectoral dimension of exposure to the treat-
ment was mostly due to governmental guidelines that were valid throughout the country, without
any element of choice on the part of sectors. The spirit of this comparison is to check whether
adopting regions or sectors did so on the basis of trends in temporary employment, so that the
comparison between treated and non treated regions in the graph represents a good approxi-
mation of the complete treated-control comparison. Similar remarks apply to the regression of
Table 2.
196 Results
We begin by assessing the impact of the two reforms on the level of job reallocation.
If the reforms decreased the costs of using certain types of temporary contracts,
then we should expect an increase in the hiring and dismissal of workers with
those same contracts, which in turn should result in an increase of employment
￿ uctuations.
We next consider the e⁄ects of the reforms on ￿rms employment, both at the
aggregate level and by contract types. Furthermore, we also investigate the e⁄ects
of the reforms on some other margins of ￿rm adjustment along which theory does
not give clear predictions and prior research has obtained mixed results: capital
(total and per worker), investment (total and per worker) and the skill mix, de￿ned
as the ratio between non-manual and manual workers in the ￿rm.
After considering the impact of the reform on various dimensions of inputs
to the production process, our analysis moves on to consider e⁄ects on produc-
tivity, looking at both labour productivity and total factor productivity (TFP).
Finally, we provide evidence on the interplay between ￿rms￿production function
and the various forms of labour contracts by estimating a the elasticity of substi-
tution among temporary employment contracts and between these and permanent
contracts.
6.1 Job reallocation
Table 3 provides results on job turnover. Panel A of the Table considers overall job
turnover. The reform of apprenticeship contracts had a positive e⁄ect on appren-
tices￿turnover, producing a statistically signi￿cant increase of about 3 percentage
points (p.p.). The reform, on the other hand, had no signi￿cant e⁄ects on the
use of other types of employment contracts, nor on turnover in total employment.
20The reform of ￿xed-term contracts had a positive e⁄ect on job reallocation within
this type of employment contracts, which is similar in size to the e⁄ect of the ap-
prenticeship reform on turnover in apprenticeship, 3 p.p.. Moreover, a somewhat
unexpected and smaller e⁄ect of this latter reform can be observed on turnover in
permanent contracts, 1 p.p.. We can also observe a negative signi￿cant e⁄ect on
total employment turnover, although of limited size, 0.5 p.p..
The measures of turnover cannot distinguish whether the e⁄ects come from
more hiring or more ￿ring. We provide insights on this point by separating ex-
panding ￿rms (i.e. ￿rms with a positive or null change in employment between
2004 and 2007) from declining ones. The results of Panel B for expanding ￿rms
con￿rm the positive e⁄ects of the reform of apprenticeships, i.e. expanding ￿rms
took advantage of the new apprenticeship contract. There are also negative ￿ non
signi￿cant￿coe¢ cients estimated on agency and collaborator workers which are
consistent with the idea that expanding ￿rms used the new contracts for sub-
stituting external workforce with workers employed by the ￿rm. The reform of
￿xed-term contracts, instead, had a signi￿cant e⁄ects on the turnover of perma-
nent workers in expanding ￿rms, but not on ￿xed-term ones. Panel C of the Table
shows that the reform of ￿xed-term contracts had an impact on the turnover of
￿xed-term workers only in contracting ￿rms. In sum, ￿rms treated by the reform
of ￿xed-term contract increased turnover of ￿xed-term workers only if they were
contracting total employment, whereas they used permanent contracts if they were
expanding. Both facts suggest that this reform was not successful in stimulating
￿xed-term employment.
6.2 Robustness
In Table 4 we assess the robustness of our ￿ndings on job turnover, focussing
on turnover in total employment (Panel A), turnover in apprenticeships (Panel
21B) and turnover in ￿xed-term contracts (Panel C). In column (1) of the Table
we show results obtained after excluding from the sample ￿rms that displayed
very low or very high levels of year to year change in capital levels, i.e. above
or below the 99th or 1st percentile in the distribution of average capital changes.
Column (2) of the Table instead adds sources of ￿rms heterogeneity by controlling
for (endogenous) ￿rms characteristics in terms of capital levels, value added and
the skill mix. Alternatively, in Column (3) we control for time invariant ￿rm
heterogeneity (both observed and unobserved) by using a ￿xed e⁄ects estimator.
Finally, in Column (4) rather than considering absolute employment changes, we
look at employment growth, i.e. we use the measure de￿ned in the previous Section
but without absolute values at the numerator.
Results for turnover in overall employment in Panel A are generally robust in
that statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cients remain signi￿cant and maintain size and
sign. In particular, Table 3 pointed towards a 0.5 p.p. penalty associated with the
reform of ￿xed-term contracts, which is still evident in Columns (1) and (2). The
e⁄ect is smaller in size when the ￿xed e⁄ect estimator is used, whereas it almost
doubles in the growth regression (minus 0.9 p.p.).
Results on turnover of apprenticeships in Panel B are also robust across columns.
The most evident di⁄erence with respect to the benchmark regression of Table 3
(Panel A, Column (4)) arises from the regression with ￿xed e⁄ects, where the esti-
mated coe¢ cient on the apprenticeship reform becomes about 1 p.p. smaller (from
3.1 to 1.8) while its standard error remains stable, resulting in an overall loss of
statistical signi￿cance. This coe¢ cient is estimated out of within-￿rm variation
over a relatively short time interval, while the dependent variable is derived from
di⁄erenced employment levels, thence it is not surprising that it loses signi￿cance.5
5Autor et al (2007) encountered similar issues of statistical signi￿cance in applying di⁄erence-
in-di⁄erences estimators with plant ￿xed e⁄ects on the same variable over a much longer time
span.
22Overall, we can interpret ￿xed e⁄ects estimates as corroborative of the evidence
on turnover of apprenticeships produced in Table 3.
Results from Panel C also point towards the robustness of the evidence on
the reform of ￿xed-term contracts, the benchmark regression this time is Column
(3) of Panel A in Table 3. We can observe again that the e⁄ect of the ￿xed-term
reform loses signi￿cance in the ￿xed e⁄ects regression (both the point estimate and
the standard error gain size, the latter relatively more) and remarks similar to the
one for the apprenticeships reform also apply in this case. The e⁄ect in Column
(4) - where we use employment growth rather than turnover as dependent variable
- is close to zero and non signi￿cant, which is consistent with the evidence from
Column (3) in Panel C of Table 3 that the reform increased turnover of ￿xed-term
contracts only in declining ￿rms.
6.3 Employment levels
The overall e⁄ect of the increase in turnover on the level employment is theo-
retically ambiguous because a higher turnover may imply a higher or lower net
employment. To understand the employment e⁄ects of the new legislation, in
Table 5 we estimate regressions for ￿rms log employment. We consider both ag-
gregate employment and employment in each of the type of contracts. All models
include ￿rms ￿xed e⁄ects.6 The apprenticeship reform had a positive e⁄ect on
the net employment of apprentices: ￿rms exposed to this reform experienced an
increase in the level of apprenticeship employment of 5.2 p.p.. This con￿rms the
evidence emerged from turnover equations in which expanding ￿rms experienced
a higher turnover of apprenticeships. The other e⁄ect of this reform is a reduction
6We experimented using Tobit regressions to account for censoring at zero in the employment
of some type of contracts. We also tried using lagged reform indicators in place of current ones.
Results of both robustness checks con￿rm our benchmark employment regression and therefore
we do not report them here.
23in the level of employment for collaborator, minus 6.5 p.p.. This is again in line
with the ￿ndings on turnover in expanding ￿rms, which appear to have used the
reform for hiring apprenticeships and reducing the use of external workforce. Of-
ten collaborator workers are young individuals in the same age range covered by
apprenticeship contracts, 15 to 30, and it may well be that ￿rms consider workers
on these contracts as substitutes for apprenticeships. A reason to move away from
external workers may be their lower attachment to the ￿rm and higher turnover
costs.
Similar positive employment e⁄ects, instead, cannot be found for the reform of
￿xed-term contracts. In this case, there are no signi￿cant e⁄ects on employment of
either permanent, ￿xed-term or apprentices, whereas there are e⁄ects on the levels
of agency and collaborator workers that go in opposite directions with respect
to each other. The overall employment e⁄ect is small (0.9 p.p.) and negative.
This evidence con￿rms that the reform of ￿xed-term employment has not been
successful in promoting the use of this type of contracts by ￿rms.
6.4 Investment, capital and skill ratio
We now explore the consequences of the reforms on other margins of ￿rms￿adjust-
ment such as capital, capital-labour substitution and investments: if reforms make
the use of temporary workers easier and facilitate adjustment ￿rms may substitute
out of capital with new (temporary) workers. Alternatively ￿rms may vary their
skill ratio: this may happen if workers with certain skills tend to be concentrated
in speci￿c types of contracts, or if the easing of temporary contracts make the use
of skills more or less intensive. A higher capital-labour ratio or a higher skill mix
should also improve productivity.
In Table 6 Columns (1) and (2) we look at the e⁄ects of the reforms on log-
capital and the log capital￿ labour ratio. The reform of ￿xed-term contracts had a
24negative e⁄ect on ￿rms￿capital and the capital labour ratio, which decreased by
2.6 and 1.6 pp. In terms of the literature discussed in Section 2, the substitution
e⁄ect between capital and labour prevailed over the ￿ hold up￿e⁄ect. In Columns
(3) and (4) we consider investment and investment per worker: since in the data
we have information on net capital K, we de￿ne investment as It = Kt￿Kt￿1, i.e.
we do not apply any depreciation rate. As was the case with capital, the reform of
￿xed-term contracts impacted negatively on investment, although standard errors
are relatively large and the estimated coe¢ cients not statistically signi￿cant at
conventional levels.
These e⁄ects of the ￿xed-term reform contrast with the ones from the reform
of apprenticeships. In this case estimated coe¢ cients are smaller in size and never
signi￿cant from a statistical point of view. The last set of results in the Table
(Column 5) refers to a di⁄erent substitution margin between skilled and unskilled
workers. We ￿nd no e⁄ects of the two reforms on the skill ratio. This is expected
in that temporary contracts are popular among both white and blue collars, par-
ticularly of young age.
6.5 Labour productivity
We now turn in Table 7 to productivity measures, which possibly represent the
most relevant benchmark to measure the economic implications of institutional
changes. We consider three di⁄erent measures of productivity. The ￿rst is labour
productivity de￿ned as real value added per worker. The second focuses on ￿rms
sales and is de￿ned as revenues per worker. Finally, we partial out the contribution
of physical capital and build a measure of TFP as the residual of a regression of
log value added on log capital and log employment.7
7We experimented using as denominator (for labour productivity) or control (for TFP) mea-
sures of employment that exclude external sta⁄ i.e. agency workers and collaborators. Dey et
al. (2006) discuss the issue of computing productivity across sectors when the sectoral a¢ liation
25Panel A of Table 7 shows that the apprenticeship reform has had a positive
and signi￿cant impact on all measures of productivity, between 0.9 p.p. and 1.6
p.p. in the case of sales per worker and TFP.8 Results on the ￿xed term reform
tell a completely di⁄erent story, all coe¢ cients being negative, sizeable (between
2.4 and 3.5 p.p.) and statistically signi￿cant.
Taken together with the results on employment turnover and employment lev-
els, the productivity e⁄ects con￿rm that while the apprenticeship reform has been
successful, the reform of ￿xed-term contracts generated e⁄ects that were opposite
to expectations. To further assess the causal interpretation of our ￿ndings, in
Panel B of Table 7 we use lagged values of the treatment indicators in place of
current values. In this way we avoid picking up any simultaneity between institu-
tional changes at the sectoral or regional level and productivity growth. Results
are robust to the use of lagged treatment indicators, the only coe¢ cient which
loses signi￿cance is the one for the e⁄ect of the apprenticeship reform on revenues
per worker.
A possible interpretation of these results is the following. The increase in the
number of apprenticeships occurred through substitution of external sta⁄, mainly
collaboration workers. The rise in productivity that we observe is likely to re￿ ect
a compositional shift in labour quality because our labour productivity measures
do not adjust for the quality of labour inputs. To the extent that external col-
laborators have lower attachment to the ￿rm and exert lower e⁄ort, the reform
of apprenticeship may have induced ￿rms to shed this unproductive labour in ex-
change for more motivated apprentices. Although we do not have direct evidence
of this, higher workers￿e⁄ort is plausibly the mechanism that may have increased
of external sta⁄ is di⁄erent from the one of the ￿rm, e.g. service sector for external sta⁄ and
manufacturing for the ￿rm. We obtained virtually identical results in the two cases, and we
present only those obtained using the overall number of workers.
8This result is similar to Autor et al. (2007) who analyze an increase in EPL and ￿nd that
TFP is reduced with an average elasticity in the order of 3 to 4 pp..
26labour productivity after the reform (Riphahn and Engellandt, 2005, Dolado and
Stucchi, 2008).
The negative productivity e⁄ects of the reform of ￿xed-term contracts are less
clear-cut. In this case, we know that ￿rms treated by this reform increased job
turnover along this margin only if they were declining, while they were more ori-
ented toward hiring permanent workers if they were expanding. This substitution
across contract types may have been an unintended consequence of the reform,
stemming from the increased uncertainty on the applicability of ￿xed-term con-
tracts brought about by the reform. In parallel, these ￿rms have also reduced
capital intensity, which may have induced the observed productivity decline.
6.6 Substitution e⁄ects
The reform of apprenticeship induced substitution of external sta⁄(agency workers
and collaborators) with apprentices. The reform of ￿xed-term contracts increased
job ￿ ows of ￿xed-term contracts but reduced signi￿cantly total turnover. Non-
declining ￿rms increased turnover of permanent workers. These results suggest
substitutability between permanent and temporary contracts and among tempo-
rary contracts of various types, which is something that has always been known
among employers but has never been investigated by economists.
In order to provide a direct assessment of substitution e⁄ects across di⁄erent
types of contracts, we also estimate the parameters of a production function in
capital and labour. We allow labour inputs to di⁄er according to the contract
type, distinguishing between permanent and temporary employment contracts and,
within temporary contracts, among the four types of temporary contracts that are
available to ￿rms. In other words we estimate a simple production function where
the four types of temporary contracts are partial substitutes and the entire group
of temporary contracts is substitutable for permanent contracts. We model the












where Q is the value added, K is capital, Lp is permanent labour and L￿ rep-
resents four types of ￿ exible labour (agency workers, collaborators, apprentices,
￿xed-term). Using this nested CES speci￿cation, parameters ￿ and ￿ govern the
substitution process between labour inputs. In particular ￿￿ = 1
1￿￿ de￿nes the sub-
stitution elasticity between varieties of temporary labour, while ￿￿ = 1
1￿￿ de￿nes
the substitution elasticity between permanent and temporary labour.
Table 8 shows that the elasticity of substitution between various types of tem-
porary contracts is high and signi￿cant, higher than the elasticity of substitution
between permanent contracts and temporary contracts. Pooling all years between
2004 and 2007, the elasticity of substitution between temporary contracts is 1.4
(with some variation across years) while the elasticity of substitution between
permanent and temporary contracts is stable at around unity. In year 2007 the
elasticity of substitution between the four types of temporary contracts is not es-
timated signi￿cantly. The elasticity of 1.4 is high and means that small changes
in relative prices between di⁄erent types of contracts yield big changes in relative
quantities. This elasticity is higher than the elasticity between temporary and
permanent contracts which have very di⁄erent characteristics and are harder to
substitute.
In the economics literature there are plenty of studies on substitutions elastic-
ities across factors of production. There are no studies though on the substitution
across di⁄erent types of temporary contracts. The most famous studies which look
at labour factors of di⁄erent types, tipically di⁄erent education levels, ￿nd elas-
ticities of substitution between college-educated and high-school educated workers
in the US in the range of 0.5 to 2.5 (Katz and Murphy, 1992, ￿nd a value of 1.4).
28These estimates are typically obtained under the assumption of the labor market
being on the relative demand curve and using information on wage bill shares.
With this method the conditional factor demand also include changes in prices or
quantities of other inputs such as capital and energy. We do not have information
on relative prices of all inputs (types of temporary contracts) therefore we esti-
mate the elasticity using a simple CES function but we control for capital thus we
control for substitution possibilities across other inputs.
7 Discussion and conclusion
The overall picture emerging from our analysis shows that the reform of appren-
ticeship contracts has been successful because it increased the turnover and the net
employment of apprentice workers. These results suggest that the reform actually
reduced the cost of apprenticeship contracts and ￿rms were encouraged to substi-
tute external temporary sta⁄ with apprentices. Although the capital￿ labour ratio
remained una⁄ected, the reform increased labour productivity possibly through
one of the mechanisms suggested in the literature, for example increasing average
worker e⁄ort through the employment of more motivated workers (i.e. apprentices
facing the prospects of training and wage growth) to replace external less moti-
vated sta⁄. The reform of ￿xed-term contracts instead does not seem to have had
the intended results: the reform reduced labour turnover, reduced the capital￿
labour ratio and had a strong negative e⁄ect on productivity. This suggests that
the reform may have made the use of ￿xed-term contracts more costly rather than
less costly as already pointed out by some of the literature on labour law.9 If re-
9Similarly to us, Autor et al. (2007), show that a substantial component of the economic
cost of the employment-at-will exceptions emanates from the uncertainty they introduced into
the employment relationship. In this sense the ￿nding that a reform increases uncertainty is not
new. In Autor et al. (2007) it is an increase in EPL whose cost is aggravated by the increase in
uncertainty, in our case it is a reform that decreases EPL whose e⁄ects are o⁄set by the increase
in uncertainty.
29allocation of labour is important and the reform of ￿xed-term contracts hampers
job reallocation across and within ￿rms (for example because it raises the costs of
consultancy for fear of the courts), then productivity falls. Indeed, ￿nding a nega-
tive e⁄ect of ￿xed-term contracts on job reallocation is a pre-requisite for claiming
that higher costs hamper the optimisation of resources and allocative e¢ ciency
(Bertola, 1990).
One possible mechanism that made the reform of apprenticeships e⁄ective and
the reform of ￿xed-term contracts ine⁄ective is respectively the substitution within
di⁄erent types of temporary workers and the substitution in favor of permanent
contracts in the face of increased uncertainty about the applicability of ￿xed-
term contracts. This interpretation is supported by estimates of high substitution
elasticities especially within di⁄erent types of temporary contracts. Contrary to
the recent past, nowadays many countries are thinking of limiting the di⁄usion of
temporary employment by limiting the use of those types of temporary contracts
that are deemed the most misused. The evidence of sustitutability provided in this
paper is to be taken to account when proposing such policies that often do not
predict the possible o⁄setting e⁄ects through the use of other types of temporary
contracts.
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Figure 1: Log employment in temporary contracts in treated and control samples.
36Table 1: Descriptive statistics for Excelsior ￿rm panel 2004-2007
Full sample Never treated Reform of Reform of
apprenticeship ￿xed term
Number of observations 53144 26182 24208 12994
2004 13286 13286 0 0
2005 13286 6922 3671 4316
2006 13286 3170 10095 4339
2007 13286 2804 10442 4339
Total employment 203.21 210.95 193.90 201.30
% Permanent contracts 88.11 87.92 88.05 88.76
% Fixed term contracts 6.02 5.78 6.38 5.99
% Apprenticeships 1.92 1.76 2.09 2.31
% Agency workers 2.32 2.25 2.44 2.10
% Collaborators 2.11 2.57 1.69 1.48
% Blue collars 60.85 60.09 61.12 60.32
% White collars 37.56 38.24 37.38 38.13
% Managers 1.59 1.67 1.50 1.55
Capital per capita (e 2004) 63653.45 63367.87 64548.91 58655.62
Job turnover 11.33 11.61 11.32 11.01
% positive employment growth 44.01 43.69 44.94 42.63
% Northwest 36.84 44.01 28.46 35.17
% Northeast 31.44 25.95 38.20 30.58
% Central 18.40 15.06 22.60 19.76
% South 13.32 14.98 10.74 14.49
% Extraction 0.72 0.98 0.52
% Manufacturing 54.55 52.98 55.24 48.39
% Energy 0.69 0.85 0.60
% Construction 5.87 2.99 7.15 17.97
% Retail trade 10.87 5.49 16.42 33.36
% Hotel and restaurants 2.19 2.68 1.91
% Transports and communication 6.97 6.32 8.34 0.28
% Finance 0.05 0.08 0.03
% Real estate 10.55 16.29 5.52
% Private education 0.47 0.80 0.17
% Private health 4.92 7.60 2.58
% Other services 2.14 2.94 1.52
37Table 2: Reform adoption and preceding trends in temporary employment
Dummy reform of Dummy reform of
apprenticeship ￿xed term
% female -0.497 -0.372
(1.174) (2.529)
% university graduates -0.839 -1.622
(1.023) (2.403)
log temp empl 0.077 0.059 0.383 0.414
(0.087) (0.093) (0.308) (0.325)
log temp empl t-1 0.018 0.012 -0.213 -0.210
(0.085) (0.091) (0.332) (0.344)
log temp empl t-2 0.132 0.120 -0.336 -0.336
(0.089) (0.095) (0.235) (0.252)
log temp empl t-3 0.003 0.005 0.0961 0.146
(0.084) (0.085) (0.312) (0.354)
log temp empl t-4 0.056 0.0511 0.0324 0.0619
(0.087) (0.089) (0.288) (0.310)
log temp empl t+1 0.048 0.030 0.108 0.107
(0.080) (0.084) (0.246) (0.258)
log temp empl t+2 0.093 0.082 -0.322 -0.351
(0.091) (0.093) (0.301) (0.320)
Constant -1.952 -1.219 -2.939 -2.385
(1.612) (2.018) (9.084) (9.729)
Region trends NO YES NO YES
Sector trends NO YES NO YES
Observations 95 95 60 60
R-squared 0.387 0.397 0.567 0.584
Notes: Source Labour Force Survey 1996-2007 collapsed by region (reform of apprenticeship contracts) and by
sector (reform of ￿xed term contracts). Dependent variable is reform dummy, additional controls include year,
region and sector dummies. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
38Table 3: The e⁄ect of reforms on job reallocation by type of contract
Total Permanent Fixed term Apprenticeship Agency Collaborators
employment contracts contracts workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All ￿rms (N=39857)
Reform of Apprenticeship -0.0020 0.0020 -0.0022 0.0313** -0.0094 -0.0230
(0.0028) (0.0049) (0.0149) (0.0147) (0.0151) (0.0163)
Reform of Fixed term -0.0054** 0.0119** 0.0309** -0.0134 -0.0040 0.0220
(0.0023) (0.0050) (0.0146) (0.0150) (0.0157) (0.0160)
Constant 0.114*** 0.113*** 0.505*** 0.259*** 0.225*** 0.498***
(0.0146) (0.0248) (0.0805) (0.0673) (0.0549) (0.0830)
R-squared 0.018 0.018 0.004 0.022 0.053 0.014
Panel B: Non-declining ￿rms (N=22835)
Reform of Apprenticeship -0.0063* -0.0008 0.0191 0.0357* -0.0235 -0.0284
(0.0034) (0.0068) (0.0194) (0.0197) (0.0198) (0.0213)
Reform of Fixed term -0.0016 0.0128* 0.0234 -0.0293 -0.0046 0.0279
(0.0032) (0.0071) (0.0200) (0.0212) (0.0215) (0.0224)
Constant 0.115*** 0.122*** 0.601*** 0.206*** 0.0840 0.433***
(0.0173) (0.0388) (0.116) (0.0790) (0.0609) (0.106)
R-squared 0.019 0.022 0.007 0.027 0.056 0.014
Panel C: Declining ￿rms (N=17022)
Reform of Apprenticeship 0.0045 0.0068 -0.0335 0.0199 0.0047 -0.0156
(0.0047) (0.0072) (0.0234) (0.0221) (0.0234) (0.0253)
Reform of Fixed term -0.0107*** 0.0105 0.0410* 0.0146 -0.0004 0.0099
(0.0034) (0.0070) (0.0216) (0.0212) (0.0229) (0.0230)
Constant 0.109*** 0.0972*** 0.383*** 0.324*** 0.400*** 0.565***
(0.0253) (0.0268) (0.103) (0.116) (0.0981) (0.130)
R-squared 0.029 0.021 0.007 0.019 0.054 0.020
Note: The dependent variable is the measure of workers ￿ow de￿ned in the text, applied to the overall ￿rm labour
force and by type of employment contract. All regressions include controls for time, region and industry.dummies
and region- and sector-speci￿c trends. Non declining ￿rms of panel (b) have non-negative employment change
between 2004 and 2007, declining ￿rms of panel (c) have negative employment change in the same period. Robust
variance estimates account for repeated observation on the same ￿rm over time. Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
39Table 4: Robustness checks on job turnover
Trim ￿rms with Controls for VA Firm Total
high capital change K and skill ratio Fixed e⁄ects employment growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Total employment
Reform of Apprenticeship -0.0024 -0.0022 0.0021 0.0034
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0034) (0.0032)
Reform of Fixed term -0.0049** -0.0051** -0.0284** -0.0094***
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0112) (0.0024)
Constant 0.113*** 0.118*** -3.545** -0.0060
(0.0148) (0.0147) (1.490) (0.0213)
Observations 38893 39857 39857 39857
R-squared 0.019 0.019 0.011 0.008
Panel B: Apprenticeship contracts
Reform of Apprenticeship 0.0286* 0.0330** 0.0180 0.0511***
(0.0149) (0.0147) (0.0168) (0.0143)
Reform of Fixed term -0.0135 -0.0144 -0.0161 -0.0083
(0.0151) (0.0150) (0.0541) (0.0103)
Constant 0.256*** 0.232*** -15.85** -0.0036
(0.0683) (0.0686) (7.206) (0.0655)
Observations 38893 39857 39857 39857
R-squared 0.022 0.024 0.003 0.003
Panel C: Fixed-term contracts
Reform of Apprenticeship -0.0013 -0.0012 0.0162 0.0079
(0.0150) (0.0149) (0.0178) (0.0172)
Reform of Fixed term 0.0326** 0.0303** 0.0562 0.0104
(0.0147) (0.0146) (0.0576) (0.0116)
Constant 0.507*** 0.489*** -2.779 0.166*
(0.0810) (0.0811) (7.958) (0.0857)
Observations 38893 39857 39857 39857
R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.003
Note: The dependent variable is the measure of workers ￿ow de￿ned in the text. All regressions include controls
for time, region and industry dummies and region- and industry-speci￿c time trends. In column 1 we trim ￿rms
with annual capital change below the 1st and above the 99th percentile. In column 2 we add value added, capital
and the ratio of white collar to blue collar as regressor; in column 4 we use employment growth rather than job
turnover as dependent variable. Robust variance estimates account for repeated observation on the same ￿rm
over time. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
40Table 5: The e⁄ect of reforms on employment
Total Permanent Fixed term Apprenticeships Agency Collaborators
employment contracts contracts workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reform of Apprenticeship 0.0013 0.0065 -0.00136 0.0521** 0.0356 -0.0652***
(0.0031) (0.0047) (0.0170) (0.0218) (0.0244) (0.0206)
Reform of Fixed term -0.0093** -0.0025 0.00409 -0.0119 -0.0931*** 0.0858***
(0.0042) (0.0065) (0.0236) (0.0290) (0.0320) (0.0280)
Constant 4.246*** 4.122*** 6.033*** 3.320 6.307** 5.862***
(0.0546) (0.0841) (1.010) (4.668) (2.459) (1.659)
Observations 53144 52932 31490 14623 17834 19434
R-squared 0.013 0.006 0.016 0.028 0.035 0.016
Number of ￿rms 13287 13286 10844 6480 7175 8704
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the number of employees by di⁄erent contract. All regressions include
controls for time, region and industry dummies plus region- and industry-speci￿c time trends and ￿rm ￿xed
e⁄ects. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 6: The e⁄ect of reforms on capital, investment and the skill ratio
Capital Capital Investments Investments Skill ratio
per worker per worker
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reform of Apprenticeship -0.0070 -0.0080 0.0125 0.0148 -0.0193
(0.0060) (0.0064) (0.0749) (0.0754) (0.0607)
Reform of Fixed term -0.0265*** -0.0160* -0.142 -0.171 0.0140
(0.0082) (0.0088) (0.259) (0.261) (0.0834)
Constant 13.90*** 9.642*** -93.68 -102.1 -1.690
(0.109) (0.116) (90.18) (90.79) (1.066)
Observations 52147 52147 15440 15440 53144
R-squared 0.007 0.006 0.015 0.014 0.003
Number of ￿rms 13267 13267 9460 9460 13287
Note: All dependent variables are in logs. Investment has 39,857 observations but many zeros. All regressions
include controls for time, region and industry dummies plus region- and industry-speci￿c time trends and ￿rm
￿xed e⁄ects. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
41Table 7: The e⁄ect of reforms on labor productivity and Total Factor Productivity
Value added per worker Sales per worker TFP
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Contemporaneous reforms
Reform of Apprenticeship 0.0147*** 0.0092** 0.0162***
(0.0048) (0.0044) (0.0046)
Reform of Fixed term -0.0279*** -0.0349*** -0.0238***
(0.0066) (0.0060) (0.0064)
Constant 9.791*** 11.61*** -0.487*
(0.301) (0.0776) (0.291)
Observations 52,840 53,144 52,675
R-squared 0.008 0.023 0.010
Number of ￿rms 13,275 13,287 13,260
Panel B: Lagged reforms
Reform of Apprenticeship 0.0131** 0.0039 0.0146***
(0.0052) (0.0047) (0.0050)
Reform of Fixed term -0.0274*** -0.0363*** -0.0248***
(0.0061) (0.0056) (0.0059)
Constant 9.766*** 11.60*** -0.517*
(0.301) (0.0776) (0.290)
Observations 52,840 53,144 52,675
R-squared 0.008 0.023 0.010
Number of ￿rms 13,275 13,287 13,260
Notes: The dependent variables are in logs, TFP is a residual of a log regression (see text for details). All
regressions include controls for time, region and industry dummies plus region- and industry-speci￿c time trends
and ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
42Table 8: Elasticity of substitution between temporary contracts and with perma-
nent contracts
Year 2004-2007 2004 2005 2006 2007
￿￿ (across temporary contracts) 1.392*** 1.215*** 1.802* 1.478*** -0.780
(0.148) (0.113) (1.023) (0.223) (6.898)
￿￿ (between temporary and permanent contracts) 1.062*** 1.070*** 1.058*** 1.060*** 1.056***
(0.254) (0.085) (0.040) (0.220) (0.092)
Observations 53145 13287 13286 13286 13286
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
43